At long last my essays are on line as my marks are in. You can download the MDT essay from here and the Parfit essay here.
A synopsis of my take on consciousness is that I think MDT is fundamentally correct, but, amongst other things, I don't see why language is a requirement, except in the sense that it is needed to communicate its apparent reality. From an inability to communicate the 'seeming' of consciousness it seems ludicrous to me to conclude that there is no seeming for that entity. While I no longer strongly agree with everything I've said in this essay, the gist of my current position should be obtainable from the essay and these (very brief) comments.
Regarding Parfit and psychological reductionism, simply put, Parfit is on the right track. Unfortunately though, Parfit simply doesn't take it far enough and accommodate three other aspects I think critical - the approximity, the perspective-dependency, and the mongrel nature of identity. Beyond this, I conclude a number of other things in this (overly!) long essay - about 9000 words - but the fact that everyone has over-simplified the question of identity is my main thrust and conclusion, and I think there are even more elements still to be considered. Perhaps a reader can come up with a hyper4-reductionist approach?